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While the ever-evolving nature of the global energy industry remains 
apparent particularly with a transition away from fossil fuel energy 
systems, the role of oil and gas particularly for emerging economies is 
undeniable. As new discoveries of oil and gas emerge in countries in 
Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia, the dominant question will 
be how to design robust regulatory governance regimes not just for the 
exploration of oil and gas but also for the management of these resources. 
As both the United Kingdom and Norway are described as mature oil 
and gas jurisdictions by virtue of their profound experience, there are 
valuable lessons to be drawn. Despite some remarkable differences in 
both the UK and Norwegian regimes, experience suggests that strategy, 
foresight, regulatory rigour, and political will are valuable to mitigating 
the consequences of the political economy of speed, which suggest the 
development of natural resources at the expense of everything else. This 
paper provides both a comprehensive and critical appraisal of both the 
UK and Norwegian regimes in a way that captures the complexity of 
divergent regulatory governance structures.    
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
 
he Norwegian resource management model is often 
considered a fairly “successful” example of how to 
manage hydrocarbon resources.
2
 The Norwegian government 
allowed a progressive development of its natural resources, 
built industry knowledge and saved reserves and revenue for 
future generations. This approach is often referred to as the 
´Norwegian Model`.
3
 The Norwegian hydrocarbon policies 
and the licensing regime are often cited as important factors 
contributing to the success of Norwegian resource 
management. However, other factors, such as the political 
system, demography, social issues, government structures, 
community support, naval traditions, amongst others, might 
also have played an important role. Norway and the United 
Kingdom (UK) started their North Sea exploration activities 
almost at the same time, and both countries adopted a 
licensing regime as a basis for resource management. 
Nevertheless, the Norwegian and the UK resource 
management models also differ in many respects.  
The first and intermediate objectives of this article is to 
analyse the regulatory models for petroleum resource 
management, including the evolution of the license systems, in 
Norway and the UK as two neighbouring and mature 
petroleum provinces. This analysis aims to make a 
________________________________________________________ 
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1
     This Paper Is Based on the Book Eduardo G. Pereira, Henrik Bjornebye 
(Eds), Regulating Offshore Petroleum Resources: The British and 
Norwegian Models (Edward Elgar 2019).’ 
2
    For further details see: Al-Kasim, Farouk (2006) Managing Petroleum 
Resources. The ‘Norwegian Model’ in a Broad Perspective. OIES 30 
(Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies). 
3
    Ibid 
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contribution to understanding the legal and policy 
consideration, as well as the economic history that underpins 
the regulatory approach adopted in the UK and Norway. 
Furthermore, an analysis of the regulatory models for 
petroleum resource management in two important and mature 
petroleum provinces should in itself be of interest for 
petroleum law practitioners and academics. While the 
“Norwegian Model” generally appears to be a popular 
example, and to some extent an inspiration, for the 
development of new resource management models in 
emerging petroleum provinces, it is our general impression 
that the British model has been less commonly referred to as 
an example for the establishment of new models in terms of 
resource management. This impression raises at least the 
following questions. First, to what extent are the Norwegian 
and British models being applied as examples or bases for the 
establishment of new petroleum resource management models 
within other jurisdictions? Second, to what extent are the 
Norwegian and British models suitable for replication within 
other jurisdictions and which precautions should be taken in 
replicating these models?  
The two questions set out above raise challenges that go 
far beyond the area of law. This applies in particular to the 
second question, as the relevance of one resource management 
model for the construction of other models also will rely on a 
number of non-legal factors, such as economy, political 
system, demography, social, and cultural aspects, etc. This 
article proceeds in five main sections. Section one introduces 
the paper. Section two provides a factual and contextual 
background for the development of hydrocarbon policies for 
each jurisdiction. Section three endeavours to link the 
development of each legal regime to the factual background of 
each country. Section four provides a comparative legal 
analysis and as such answers the two questions above. 
Although the fluidity and legal nature of this paper make it 
almost impossible to provide a firm answer to all aspects of the 
questions, the legal and regulatory analysis sufficiently 
explores the main research questions. Section five covers the 
conclusions while the last section provides recommendations 
from this paper.  
It is relevant to point out that in a continuously evolving 
global energy landscape and several pressures to meet energy 
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expectation as well as climate changes affirmation actions, the 
discussion on how mature regimes have regulated oil and gas 
remain pertinent. The reason being that, not only would oil 
and gas continue to be relevant in a global stage (particularly 
in developing and less advanced jurisdictions), but those 
engaged in renewable energy might learn from the past 
mistakes from the hydrocarbon sector and avoid repeating 
similar mistakes.  
Therefore, critical evaluation of resource management in 
mature oil and gas regimes like the UK and Norway would 
not only provide valuable lessons for the development of new 
hydrocarbon provinces like Guyana or Senegal but also for the 
development of other types of energy resources as part of 
resource management.  
 
2. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF OIL AND 
GAS DEVELOPMENT  THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
Oil discovery in the UK dates to the 1850s (shale oil) but it 
was not until 1919 that conventional oil was discovered albeit 
not in commercial quantities.
4
 Following the Second World 
War, Britain was compelled to search for alternative energy 
sources. It was not until the 1960s that there was some 
glimmer of hope and the search was intensified.
5
 In the 1970s 
the search for oil in the UK had proved successful as 
commercially viable quantities of oil were discovered.
6
 This 
discovery was inspired by discoveries in the Dutch Groningen 
________________________________________________________ 
4
     Alex Kemp, The Official History of North Sea Oil and Gas: The Growi- 
ng Dominance of the State Vol 1 (Routledge 2012) page 7. 
5
   The National Archives “The Cabinet Papers” online a https://www.  
nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/north-sea-oil-gas.htm 
accessed on the 25
th
 of October 2020. 
6
    Wesley G Carson The Other Price of Britain’s Oil: Safety and Control  
in the North Sea (Martin Robertson Oxford  1982) 2 




 The Government passed the 1964 Continental Shelf 
Act in a bid to encourage the growth of the industry.
8
  
The economic history within which the UK developed its oil 
and gas regime certainly provides some explanation to both its 
approach and to some extent, its successes especially as it 
relates to the resources curse debate. As Heffron et al. explain 
“The first trend began with the industrial revolution at the 
close of the eighteenth century, which transformed Britain’s 
economy and society and made it the richest country in the 
world…  
The country had the highest gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita in the world”.
9
 This was achieved by the use 
of new technologies and growth in industries like textiles, 
iron, and coal. By the late nineteenth to early twentieth 
centuries, Britain had lost its dominance in the global 
economy.
10
 Despite the economic and commercial impact of 
the First World War on European countries, which caused 
significant debt and inflation, the UK still enjoyed more 
economic advantage than most of its European counterparts 
like France and West Germany.
11
 Between 1960 and 1973, the 
United Kingdom had begun to experience significant 
economic challenges with inflation, devaluation, low 
employment and high national debts. The situation became 
particularly challenging as wages were capped.
12
 There were 
equally energy security concerns as the coal factories, which 
produced most of the energy were blocked as a result of a 
________________________________________________________ 
7
     Greg Gordon “Hydrocarbon Policies and Legislation: United Kingdom” 
in Eduardo G. Pereira and Henrik Bjornebye (eds), Regulating Offshore 
Petroleum Resources: The British and Nowegian Models (Edward Elgar 
2019) 165-173.  
8
   Greg Gordon, Aileen Mcharg and John Paterson, “Energy Law in the 
UK”, in Martha Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Anita Ronne and 
Inigo Del Guayo, Energy Law in Europe, (3
rd
 ed Oxford University 
Press, 2016) at 14.11 
9
  Raphael Heffron, Mohammad Hazrati, Greg Gordon and Darren 
McCauley “Background United Kingdom” in Eduardo G Pereira and 
Henrik Bjornebye (eds), Regulating Offshore Petroleum Resources: 
      The British and Norwegian Models (Edward Elgar 2019) page 129. 
10
   George Band “Fifty Years of UK Offshore Oil and Gas” (1991) Vol157 
(2) The Geographical Journal 180. 
11
   Ibid 128-164. 
12
   Ibid. 
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labour strike. These economic and energy security challenges 
explain the Government’s enthusiasm to explore for oil.  
In addition, other industries like shipping, shipbuilding, 
fisheries and services played an important role in the 
development of the oil and gas industry in the UK. Being an 
island nation, the shipping sector bloomed and it has 
significantly contributed to the UK economy since the 1870s. 
This was as a result of its “access to large markets which 
offered opportunities for mass production, specialization, 
cheap supply of raw materials and skilled men”.
13
 The 
industry provided employment and a much-needed financial 
boost. It is estimated that in 2019 the industry contributed 
about £24billion to the UK’s GDP while creating about 
270,000 jobs.
14
 With the discovery of oil and gas, it is evident 
that such an industry must have played a pivotal role in the 
growth and development of the oil and gas industry.  
Furthermore, it is relevant to point out that other crucial 
factors helped the UK at the beginning of its oil and gas 
developments: high level of education; highly sophisticated 
and longstanding legal system; fairly good standing with 
transparency and a low amount of corruption as well.
15
 These 
factors placed the UK in an advantageous position to develop 
its oil and gas resources.  
The UK oil and gas industry has had a significant impact 
on the UK economy. Although such economic impact could 
easily be attributed to its sophisticated legal regime, it is hard 
to deny the role of its advanced infrastructure, diversified 
economy, and industry expertise.
16
 The UK remains the 
second-largest oil producer and the third gas producer in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) for the European continent. It was estimated that by 
2017 more than 43 billion barrels had been recovered since 
commercial oil exploration began in 1967 and about £330 
________________________________________________________ 
13
   Ibid 
14
   Oil and Gas UK Economic Report 2019 online at  https://oilandgasuk- 
      .co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Economic-Report-2019 OGUK. 
pdf  6 accessed on the 25
th
 of October 2020. 
15
   Alex Kemp The Official History of North Sea Oil and Gas: 
      Moderating the State’s Role Voume II (2012 Routeledge). 
16
  Fred Atkinson and Stephen Hall, Oil and the British Economy Vol 6 
(Routledge 2016) page 18. 
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billion in corporate tax has been contributed to the Treasury.
17
 
In 2018, the UK oil and gas industry contributed about 45 per 
cent to the country’s energy needs.
18
 Despite the low 
investment climate within the industry, particularly owing to 
the downturn, it is difficult to ignore the contributions of oil 
and gas to the UK energy security and the economy in general.  
2.1   Norway 
There are significant similarities, but also some very important 
differences, separating the way that Norway and the UK 
approached the development of oil and gas in the mid-1960s. 
Primary among the differences was Norway’s economic 
trajectory. While the UK was retreating from its imperial 
heights and could draw on a very long history of industrial 
development, Norway was slowly ascending the world’s 
economic ladder and had not yet been seen as a particularly 
wealthy country, pre-oil.
19
 Neither was Norway poor: even 
though she was a very young country (gaining independence 
in 1905), she had developed a strong set of legal and political 
institutions; and she could draw from a highly trained and 
well-organized labour force -accustomed to adjusting rapidly 
to a changing global economy. 
The engine of Norwegian economic development has 
always been fuelled by natural resources: fish, timber, ships, 
hydroelectric production (and the production of commodities 
that use cheap power) and now oil and gas. The 
industrialization of Norway was powered by huge 
hydroelectric installations, built at the very time Norway was 
wrestling its economic and political independence from 
Sweden. At that turn to the twentieth century, Norway 
________________________________________________________ 
17
  House of Commons Library “UK Offshore Oil and Gas Industry”       
(2017) Briefing paper CBP 07268 online at  
18
   Oil and Gas UK Economic Report 2019 online at https://oilandgasuk. 
co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Economic-Report-2019-OGUK. 
pdf  6 accessed on the 25
th
 of October 2020. 
19
   To learn more about Norway’s economic development before World 
War I, see Jonathon W. Moses (2005) Norwegian Catch-up: 
Development and Globalization before World War II (Aldershot, 
Hampshire: Ashgate, 2005). For a nice survey of more recent political 
and economic history in Norway, see Erik Jarlsby (2019) “Background: 
Norway,” in Eduardo G. Pereira and Henrik Bjørnebye (eds) Regulating 
Offshore Petroleum Resources: The British and Norwegian Models 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar): 6-38. 
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developed a novel concessions system that limited foreign 
access to Norwegian waterfalls and ensured public control 
over common resources. She did so by securing a share of the 
value being produced at these hydroelectric installations, and 
by requiring that all capital investments (and the right of 
access) were returned to the state after an agreed-upon period 
of time (so-called hjemfall). This concessionary arrangement 
for the private exploitation of common resources -designed 
and built in the first two decades of the 20
th
 century - became 
the foundation for Norway’s subsequent petroleum 
management regime, once oil was first discovered.  
This was not pre-ordained. Unlike the UK, Norway did not 
have any previous experience with (shale) oil or gas on its 
sovereign territory. Before the late 1960s, Norwegian 
geological experts were convinced that there was no oil to be 
found in Norway - either onshore or of. Hence, the discovery 
of oil initiated an organizational scramble, as the Norwegian 
authorities considered how best to manage its new resource. 
After surveying the approaches of other oil countries, the 
needs of international oil companies, and its previous 
successes in managing its waterfall resources, the Norwegian 
authorities drew up a blueprint for how best to manage its 
petroleum resources, on behalf of the Norwegian people. The 
result was a novel institutional triad, where the need for 
autonomous policymaking, regulation and operational 
expertise was balanced against one another.
20
 The result is 




In addition to its earlier experience in managing other 
natural resources (and foreign capital), Norway was able to 
draw on several local competencies that proved extremely 
beneficial, once oil production began offshore. In this way, 
Norway’s experience was somewhat similar to the UK’s. 
Norway’s deep seafaring and boat-building traditions allowed 
the country to quickly fill the demand for new boats that 
could safely navigate the volatile North Sea region. After all, 
________________________________________________________ 
20
  Moses, Jonathon W. and Bjørn Letnes (2017) Managing Resource 
Abundance and Wealth: The Norwegian Experience (New York: 
Oxford University Press). Much of the Norwegian section of this article 
draws from this book. 
21
 Al-Kasim, Farouk (2006) Managing Petroleum Resources. The 
‘Norwegian Model’ in a Broad Perspective. OIES 30 (Oxford: Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies).  
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the first generation of supply boats, and the first drilling rigs, 
were dragged over from the Gulf of Mexico, and their 
shortcomings were almost immediately obvious—the 
conditions in the North Sea are much more challenging than 
those found in the Gulf. Norway’s experience with massive 
dam-building projects had created highly competent concrete 
and engineering facilities - and this domestic expertise became 
instrumental when the offshore industry needed enormous 
undersea bunkers made of concrete (e.g. the Ekofisk tank), 
and turned to gigantic production platforms built of concrete 
(e.g. of the Condeep type, ala Troll). Norway’s engineering 
schools, and its related industrial base, were already geared to 
providing these sorts of competencies before oil was found, 
and were quickly drafted into service, once viable wells were 
discovered.  
As in the UK, the resulting oil and gas industry has had an 
enormous and lasting impact on the Norwegian economy. 
Today, Norway produces about three per cent of global 
demand and is the third-largest exporter of natural gas 
(following Russia and Qatar).
22
 Norwegian gas supplies 
roughly a quarter of the EU’s current gas demand.
23
 It is most 
common to point to Norway’s phenomenal wealth, collected 
in the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund: the Government 
Pension Fund Global (GPFG).
24
 A half-century of petroleum 
production, under some of the world’s most challenging 
conditions (deep water, hazardous surface conditions, 
challenging weather), has also resulted in the development of 
world-class expertise in Norwegian engineering, production, 
and supply industries. Today, the oil and gas sector is 
Norway's largest, when measured in terms of value-added, 
government revenues, investments and export value. While 
the 2020 figures are smaller than in years past, the oil and gas 
sector captures about 10 per cent of Norway’s GDP and state 
________________________________________________________ 
22
  Norwegian Petroleum (2020) “Exports of Oil and Gas.” 29 June 2020 
draft. Online at https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/production-and-
exports/exports-of-oil-and-gas/. Accessed on the 30
th
 of September 
2020. Norwegian Petroleum (www.norskpetroleum.no) is an 
information website run by the MPE and NPD. 
23
   Ibid. 
24
  Norges Bank Investment Management (2020) “The Fund.” Online at 
https://www.nbim.no/en/. Accessed on 30
th
 of September 2020. 
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revenues, roughly 30 per cent of its export value
25
 and perhaps 





3. REGULATING OIL AND GAS 
EXPLORATION 
 
3.1   The United Kingdom Continental Shelf 
The regulation and management of the UK oil and gas 
industry following the First World War began with the 
promulgation of the Petroleum (Production) Act 1918.
27
 The 
key issue at the time was ownership of the oil and gas industry, 
unfortunately, the Act did not resolve this. The issue of 
ownership remained unresolved and the unsuccessful attempts 
of state-funded drilling activities meant that the oil and gas 
industry under the 1918 Act did not develop as it should 
have.
28
 Also, the fact that the importation of oil was provided 
at a very reasonable cost meant that there was very little 
motivation to spend so many resources exploring for oil.
29
   
In 1934, The Petroleum (Production) Act was 
promulgated to encourage the growth of the industry and it 
was a piece of legislation that significantly changed the nature 
of oil and gas operations in the UK particularly as it relates to 
________________________________________________________ 
25
  Norwegian Petroleum (2020) “The Government’s Revenues.” 12 May 
2020 version. Online at https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/econom-
y/governments-revenues/. Accessed on the 26th of September 2020.  
26
   Statistics Norway (2019) “Ringvirkninger av petroleumsnæringen inorsk 
økonomi.” Report 2019/37.  Online at: https://www.ssb.no/na sjo-
nalregnskap-og-konjunkturer/artikler-ogpublikasjoner/attachment/40-
5655?_ts=16ecb1da138 Accessed on the 30
th
 of September 2020. 
27
    For detailed discussion of the UK oil and gas regulatory regime, see Greg 
Gordon, John Paterson and Emre Usenmez “UK oil and Gas Law: 
Current Practice and Emerging Trends Vol1 (3
rd
 Edition Edin-burgh 
University Press 2018). 
 
28
    Greg Gordon, “Hydrocarbon Policies and Legislation: United King- 
      dom” in Eduardo G. Pereira and Henrik Bjornebye (eds), Regulating 
Offshore Petroleum Resources: The British and Nowegian Models 
(Edward Elgar 2019) pages 165-210. 
29
   Ibid. 




 The Act in resolving the ownership controversy 
vested in the Crown ‘property in petroleum, existing in its 
natural condition in strata in Great Britain’
31
 and ‘granted it 
exclusive right to search and bore for and get such 
petroleum’.
32
 Owing to the power, the Crown exercised this 
right by granting licenses in exchange for royalties and taxes.
33
 
The 1934 Act did not contain any penalties for a breach in the 
licences. One argument for this amongst others could be to 
encourage investment and foster the growth of the industry.
34
 
From an onshore perspective, the principles in the 1934 Act 
are replicated in the 1998 Petroleum Act save for some 
amendments.  
With less encouraging oil and gas development onshore 
and encouraged by discoveries in Netherland and Norwegian 
Continental Shelf in the 1950s and 1960s respectively, the UK 
intensified efforts to exploit for oil and gas offshore.
35
 
Therefore, without very much thought of an alternative or the 
differences and similarities between onshore and offshore 
regimes,
36
 it exported its “existing and largely untested 
landward licensing regime” offshore.
37
  
To encourage exploration of its oil and gas resources at a 
time when the UK was in grave economic difficulties, the 
Continental Shelf Act of 1964 was enacted and Section 1(1) 
vested in the Crown “any rights exercised by the United 
Kingdom outside territorial waters concerning the sea-bed 
and subsoil and their natural resources”, except coal, which 
________________________________________________________ 
30
  Greg Gordon, “Production Licensing on the UK Continental Shelf: 
Miniterial Powers and Controls” (2015) 4(1) LSU Journal pf Energy and 
Natural Resources 75.  
31
   Section 1(1) Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 fundamentally.  
32
   Ibid.  
33
    Mary Sabina Peters and Manu Kumar, “Unique UK’s Licensing Favours 
the State than the Industry: Contradicting Conventionsl Wisdom” 
(2013) 54 (2) Acta Juridica Hungarica 204 
34
   Ibid.  
35
   Greg Gordon, “Hydrocarbon Policies and Legislation: United Kingdom 
     ” in Eduardo G. Pereira and Henrik Bjornebye (eds), Regulating Off-
shore Petroleum Resources: The British and Nowegian Models (Edward 
Elgar 2019) pages 170-210. 
36
  Alex Kemp “Official History of North Sea Oil Vol 1: The Growing 
Influence of the State (Routledge 2012) page 9. 
37
   Ibid.  
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was vested in the National Coal Board.
38
 With a somewhat 
skeletal regime in place, the priority was to explore for oil and 
reap the benefits. This was evidenced in the perhaps “broad 
discretionary powers of the Secretary of State and leaving the 
fine detail of the relationship between the state and the licensee 
to the Model Clauses and the terms of the individual 
licence”.
39
 It must be noted that the unique nature of the UK 
licensing regime meant that it was not a lease and the state 
contrary to the position onshore, the state does not purport to 
own the continental shelf or the oil and gas in the strata 
beneath it but only exercises “sovereign rights”. Therefore in 
exercising such right the Crown simply authorises an activity, 
which would have been otherwise considered unlawful.40 In 
doing so, the license in both its regulatory and contractual 
nature transmits the ownership of the hydrocarbon upon 
exploration to the licensee. This to a very large extent limited 
the role of state participation or control.  
With full implementation of what seemed like a fairly effective 
oil and gas regime, the expectation was that Britain would opt 
for majority participation through the establishment of a 
national oil company. This led the then Labour Government 
to enact the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act of 1975, 
which essentially related to the ownership of production. The 
Labour government argued that if elected, it would: 
Take majority participation in all future oil licenses 
and negotiate to achieve majority state participation 
in existing licences. Set up a British National Oil 
Corporation to enable the Government to exercise 
participation rights; to play an active role in future 
developments, exploration and exploitation of 
________________________________________________________ 
38
   S 1 (2) Continental Shelf Act.  
39
   Greg Gordon, “Production Licencing on the UK Continental Shelf: Mi-
nisterial Powers and Controls’, (2015) 4 LSU Journal of Energy Law and 
Resources, pp75-95. 
40
   Greg Gordon “Petroleum Licensing” in Greg Gordon, John Patersonand 
      Emre Usenmez (eds.) UK Oil and Gas Law: Current Practice and Emer-
ging Trends (Resource Management and Regulatory Law) (Edinburg 
University Press 2018) 84.  
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While some temporary successes were achieved in the 
formation of British National Oil Company by the Labour 
government, it was not very long after that the Conservative 
government subsequently decided to privatise both the British 
National Oil Company and the British Gas Corporation.
42
 
The Conservative Party based its decision on the general move 
against state ownership of (generally profitable) assets, which 
were capable of being managed by the private sector and to 
improve energy efficiency. However it is viewed, it is hard to 
ignore the influence of political ideologies on the regulation 
and management of the British oil and gas regime. In some 
ways, such political influences could be responsible for the 
lack of strategic foresight and inconsistencies (especially in the 
governmental participation and tax regime).
43
 These concerns 
are certainly responsible for the current state of the industry.  
Regarding local content and state participation, the UK took 
a slightly concerning approach particularly in the context of 
the oil and gas industry. While acknowledging the relevance 
of local content regulation and policies in the development of 
an industry and an opportunity to maximise economic 
recovery, its application varies from state to state. While some 
jurisdictions have clearly defined minimum local content 
requirement, others have a more flexible approach. It is 
difficult to say, which is more effective as the robustness of the 
local content regime, is largely dependent on factors beyond 
the regulatory design. Although, there have been attempts to 
develop local content through direct state participation in the 
________________________________________________________ 
41
   Philp Wright and Juan Carlos Boue “The United Kingdom: Public Deb-
ate and the Management of Petroleum Resources” in IndraOverland (e-
ds) Public Brainpower: Civil Society and Natural Resources Manageme-
nt (Palgrave Macmillian 2018) 331. 
42
    Stephanie Hoopes “The Privatization of UK Oil Assets 1977-87: Rationa 
      -l Policy Making, International Changes and Domestic Constraints” 
(1994) A PhD thesis submitted to the Department of Government of 
International Relations, London school of Economics.  
43
   Greg Gordon “Petroleum Licensing” in Greg Gordon, John Paterson a-
nd Emre Usenmez (eds.) UK Oil and Gas Law: Current Practice and 
Emerging Trends (Resource Management and Regulatory Law) 
(Edinburg University Press 2018) 84.  
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early years of the North Sea development along with 
incentives to increase higher participation of the local supply 
chain, in more recent times it has become apparent that there 
was no explicit and specific local content regime in the UK 
offshore oil and gas industry as it is commonly provided in 
other jurisdictions.
44
 This is not to say there are no efforts to 
develop the supply chain especially through efforts like the 
Offshore Supply Office and the Maximisation of Economic 
Recovery (MER) Strategy,
45
 but nothing like the traditional 
local content regimes that can be found be found in other oil 
and gas jurisdictions. The closest the UK got to a local content 
policy was back in the 1970s when the ‘full and fair 
opportunity’ principle was included the Department of 
Energy’s licence allocation procedure.
46
 This principle 
required the licence applications to be determined based on 
the applicant’s ability to guarantee the full and fair 
opportunity to UK industries.
47
 Not very much success was 
recorded in terms of significant local content development and 
the policy was eventually discontinued because it was 
discriminatory and protectionist vis-à-vis its community 




3.2   Regulating Oil and Gas Exploration in Norway  
 
In many ways, the nature of Norway’s regulatory regime 
could not be more different than the British one just 
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 These differences probably reflect the very 
different times and contexts in which issues of ownership and 
control were being discussed in the two countries. For the 
United Kingdom, many of the most important issues of 
ownership and control were being settled in the interwar 
period, whereas Norway only began to address them in the 
1970s - in a global context where national control of natural 
resources was on the rise.   
In Norway, public ownership and control of these 
offshore natural resources were never in doubt.
50
 What most 
worried the Norwegian authorities was the question of how 
far that Norwegian ownership and control extended beyond 
Norway’s coastline. For that reason, the very first political 
issue to be determined was the exact location of the territorial 
boundaries that separated Norway from her neighbours. In 
particular, before Norway began developing its regulatory 
regime, it first negotiated the limits to its territorial boundaries 
with both the UK and Denmark - to ensure that it had 
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sovereign control over that territory. By May of 1963, 
Norway’s Prime Minister, Einar Gerhardsen, could proclaim 
sovereignty over the Norwegian Continental Shelf.
51
 In 
hindsight, this effort to secure the boundaries, before any 
petroleum assets were found on the territory, proved very 
fruitful, as much of Norway’s subsequent petroleum activity 
occurred around the border territory shared by Norway, 
Denmark, and the UK.  
Once Norway secured an agreement with her neighbours 
about the boundaries of her sovereign control, she could begin 
to establish a licensing regime for the eventual exploration and 
production. At the time (the early-1960s), there was hardly 
any interest in Norway’s offshore territory: most 
international attention was being focused on the other 
countries surrounding the North Sea rim: especially the 
Netherlands and the UK. Norway was the odd one out, and 
only one company - Phillips Petroleum - seemed to be 
interested in exploring Norwegian territory. It was, indeed, 
Phillip’s stubborn persistence to secure the rights to 
exploration in Norway that eventually pushed the Norwegian 
authorities into action. Given the absence of international 
interest at the time, it was probably not so remarkable that 
Phillips’ original request (October 1962) asked for the 
exclusive rights to all petroleum on Norwegian territory (at 
the bargain price of just $160,000 a month).
52
 With hindsight, 
however, we can see it was a remarkably bold bid!  
Fearing a drought of interested parties, the first allocation 
of Norwegian licenses was unusually liberal. A huge section 
of the Norwegian continental shelf was put on the market (the 
largest ever in Norwegian history), and the terms of the 
resulting licenses were incredibly generous.53 The initial intent 
was to try and attract as much of the international expertise as 
was needed, and Norway did this by offering extremely 
favourable terms. Remember, Norway was competing 
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directly with the UK at this time, to secure the international 
expertise, capital and interest that was circulating in the North 
Sea - as the world began searching frantically for more reliable 
sources of energy (i.e., beyond the Middle East). Worse, 
Norway was saddled with two distinct disadvantages in this 
competition (from the perspective of international investors): 
a lack of faith that the resources were to be found under 
Norwegian waters, and Norway’s socialist history and 
reputation. 
Norway was extremely lucky in that this initial activity 
(during the first allocation round) was mostly unsuccessful. 
By the end of the first round, in 1969, interest in the 
Norwegian fields was declining, and companies were 
beginning to withdraw their activities from the Norwegian 
shelf. It was only with the surprise discovery at Ekofisk, in 
December 1969, that interest in the Norwegian field was again 
buoyed. In discovering a huge new field of activity, Norway’s 
attractiveness as a petroleum destination changed overnight: 
Norway was now in the driver’s seat and changed the nature 
of the consequent contract terms as a result (to the evident 
disgust of international oil companies). 
The management regime that developed with (and after) this 
second allocation round (1969-1971), allowed for significant 
national control and ownership over, and benefit from, 
Norwegian petroleum resources. This scope for political 
autonomy was larger in the 1970s than it was in the interwar 
period (when the UK was developing its regime), and it was 
much greater than we find in the world today. After all, OPEC 
was created in September 1960, and in 1962, the UN General 
Assembly adopted its “UN Resolution on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources.”
54
 In a broader context, 
the 1970s was a time when the international community was 
considering a New International Economic Order, and 
democratic pressures and protests were springing forth 
around the world.  
Unlike the UK, Norway took advantage of this scope for 
autonomous policy and developed a regime that secured 
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strong democratic control over the resource (and its rents). 
This control is most evident in Norway’s famed “10 Oil 
Commandments”, which provided the political guidelines for 
subsequent development.
55
 The nature of the resulting 
licensing regime
56
 allowed Norway to control the pace of 
development on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), 
promote the development of Norwegian competence and 
ensure that a broader Norwegian competence was tapped and 
encouraged. The results of this control can be seen on several 
fronts, including the establishment of a competent and 
powerful NOC (Statoil, now Equinor), vibrant domestic 
supply industry and the development of sophisticated 
technical expertise - both in the research community and in 
the industry more generally. Much of this activity has 
subsequently graduated from the NCS to become competitive 
in the global economy. At the same time, the nature of this 
regime allowed the Norwegian people to secure enormous 
wealth, in the form of the returns from shared licenses (so-
called State’s Direct Financial Interest, or SDFI), and the 
phenomenal growth of the GPFG.  
 
4. LESSONS LEARNT 
This section is divided into three parts. Firstly it deals with 
lessons from the UK. Secondly, it deals with lessons from 
Norway. In each of these parts, the UK and Norwegian 
lessons are organised under four rubrics: a) political and fiscal 
(in)stability and long term perspectives; b) health, safety and 
environmental regulatory challenges; c) challenges in 
regulating third-party access to infrastructure; and d) offshore 
decommissioning. Thirdly it highlights the key common areas 
and distinctions from both experiences.  
4.1   The UK experience  
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4.1.1   Political and Fiscal Instability and Lack of Long-Term 
Perspectives  
Despite the recorded successes of the UK oil and gas industry, 
it is important to identify some challenges that were 
experienced. Of particular relevance, is the Political Economy 
of Speed.
57
 This is the perhaps understandable haste of a 
Government upon the discovery of oil and gas to prioritise its 
exploitation at the expense of both strategic thinking and the 
needed regulatory interventions. While such haste is 
understandable in the interim, the challenges are long-lasting 
and, in some cases, irreversible. The impact of a political 
economy of speed in the development of the UK oil and gas 
sector is evidence in its somewhat ad hoc licensing regime, 
relative lack of strategic planning and state direction and the 
non-interventionist governance approach where the State 
played a less pronounced policy role.
58
 Perhaps it is in this 
regard that Gordon criticised the early licencing and 
governance regime as being “insufficiently sophisticated to 
properly protect the State’s Interest”.
59
 Further evidenced by 
the fact that licences were given with long terms, minimal 
relinquishment requirements and limited powers on the State 
to direct or influence the pace of operations”.
60
 This led to a 
weakness in the fiscal regime, which meant that it was 
“possible for a licensee to manipulate its affairs to artificially 
create a situation where no tax was payable relative to its 
upstream operations”.
61
 While this problem was later resolved 
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through several regulatory interventions, which also 
contributed for the well-known instability of the UK oil and 
gas tax regime, other challenges like the regulations of health, 
safety and environmental and the question of a sovereign 
Wealth Fund were identified.
62
  
Also, it is outside the scope of this article to deal with the 
complex fiscal system in the UK and its evolution throughout 
time.
 63
 However, it is possible to highlight that the UK 
changed its fiscal system several times throughout the past 
decades. Quite often in favour of the Government. 
6465
 For 
example, as the UKCS became closer to its maturity the UK 
Government realize that certain measures should be taken to 
ease the fiscal arrangement to maintain a higher level of 
investment, such as the abolishment of royalties.
66
 It is 
interesting to mention that the UK fiscal system never 
captures a bonus requirement as the main focus was towards 
exploration and production activities.
67
 The lack of stability in 
the fiscal system may have caused a significant impact on the 
way investors foresee the confidence and return of their 
investments.  
The above theory of the political economy of speed and 
the UK’s lack of strategic long term vision on the management 
of the proceeds of its oil and gas informed the reluctance to 
establish a Sovereign Wealth Fund, unlike her Norwegian 
counterpart. This is despite several parliamentary debates on 
the need to establish one.
68
 Informed by the UK leaving the 
European Union, a most recent debate on the need to create 
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“We are historically worse at long-term planning 
than many other developed nations: …Other oil-
rich countries like Norway have built up large 
sovereign wealth funds, but we have not. Can we 
resolve this weakness using the spur of our newly 
found freedoms to change the way we work once 
separation from the EU is complete”
69
 
Penrose’s expectation that having a SWF could make UK the 
strongest economy in the G20 makes an argument that if 
established in the early years of oil and gas explorations, 
perhaps there would have been significant benefits. Despite 
the apparent benefits of a SWF, the response by Simon Kirby 
from Her Majesty’s Treasury seemed to suggest that a SWF 
was not one of the government’s priorities. Despite the 
arguments of Penrose MP for a SWF in the UK, the UK 
government remains less willing to establish one.  
In the absence of a SWF from oil and gas revenue, there 
were several consultations and perhaps some willingness on 
the part of the government to establish one for shale gas 
extraction.
70
 The fund was designed to “consist of up 10 per 
cent of tax from shale gas production, to be used for the 
benefit of communities which host shale sites”.
71
  During the 
consultation for a Shale Wealth Fund, the government argued 
that:  
“The local people should have greater control and 
say in decisions that affect them. More than this, we 
are committed to delivering an economy that works 
for everyone, through ensuring that the benefits of 
economic growth and investment are spread as 
________________________________________________________ 
69
   John Penrose MP “The Great Rebalancing: A Sovereign Wealth Fund to 
make the UK’s Economy the Strongest in the G20” (2016) online at ht-
tp://www.smf.co.uk/publications/the-great-rebalancing-a-sovereign 
wealth-fund-to-make-the-uks-economy-the-strongest-in-the-g20/ 
accessed on the 27
th
 February 2020. 
70
  Her Majesty’s Treasury “Shale Wealth Fund: Response to the Consu-   
ltation” (2017) online at <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/-
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/658793/shale
_-wealth_ fund_response_web.pdf> accessed on the 27th of February 
2020. 
71
   Ibid. 
The Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy    272 
widely as possible. This is why we are creating a 
Shale Wealth Fund, which could deliver up to £1 
billion of funding and will ensure that the benefits 
of shale developments are directed to the 
communities that host them”
72
 
In what appeared to be a test run, independently, companies 
decided to make payments to host communities, perhaps as a 
sign of goodwill following the community engagement 
charter that was published by the UK onshore Oil and Gas 
(UK OOG). Following the commencement of exploratory 
drilling at Preston, Lancashire, £100, 000 was paid by 
Caudrilla to an independent Community Benefit Fund.
73
 In 
fact, 80 per cent of the local residents indicated that rather than 
invest in different community projects, they would prefer 
direct payments to households within 1.5 km of the site.
74
 
With increasing uncertainties over the future of the UK shale 
gas industry particularly owing to the realisation that risks 
could potentially outweigh any meaningful benefit
75
 and the 
enthusiasm to explore cleaner energy sources, it can be argued 
the Shale Wealth Fund is moribund.  
4.1.2 Health, Safety and Environmental Regulatory 
Challenges 
From a Health and Safety risk governance perspective, the 
UKCS has had its share of regulatory challenges as it appeared 
to be experimenting with different regulatory methods. It is 
important to note that regulating the offshore oil and gas 
industry in the United Kingdom, and indeed other parts of the 
world, is quite a challenging task. This challenge is not only as 
a result of the uncertain and hazardous nature of the offshore 
environment but also due to evolving technology. The 
situation is complicated further by the constant tension 
between HSE (Health, Safety and Environment) and cost 
especially as energy companies are under pressure to meet 
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deadlines and deliver various forms of energy with the lowest 
possible financial implication.
76
 Unfortunately, this tension, in 
most cases, is resolved in favour of cost especially as energy 
operators and contractors are enthusiastic in their quest to 
maximise profit and are therefore unable to find the 
appropriate balance.
77
 This challenge appears to be one of the 
reasons behind some of the offshore safety disasters that have 
befallen the oil and gas industry and the UK has had its share 
of these experiences. Having experimented with several 
offshore safety regulatory regimes, in the aftermath of the 
Piper Alpha disaster where 168 men were killed, the UK made 
significant regulatory changes and settled for the Safety 
Case/Goal Setting approach. This section suggests that there 
are significant lessons to be drawn from the UK offshore oil 
and gas experience in this regard. One such lesson is the 
adoption of a safety case regulatory model that is most suitable 
for regulating health and safety risks in a complex and 
unpredictable offshore energy environment.
78
  
The United Kingdom’s Continental Shelf (UKCS) is 
popularly referred to as a mature province owing to the 
growth of its oil and gas exploration, likewise its offshore 
health and safety regime.
79
 Unfortunately, most of these were 
reactive and only occurred owing to offshore health and safety 
challenges such as accidents. These offshore health and safety 
challenges and accidents are reflected in the regulatory 
architecture - from Defacto-Self regulation under the licensing 
regime to a prescriptive regulatory regime with multiple laws 
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Having adopted the safety case regulatory model and 
being apparently satisfied with the approach, in 2010, the 
suitability of this approach was questioned, especially in the 
aftermath of the 2010 Macondo disaster in the Gulf of Mexico 
and the passing of the EU Offshore Safety Directive. The UK 
has had to once again restructure its offshore health and safety 
regulatory landscape.
81
 While there is some confidence in the 
safety case regime, UK offshore oil and gas safety regulatory 
architecture will continue to be tested especially with 
decommissioning and new discoveries further offshore. 
Although the UK government appeared somewhat 
content with its Safety Case regime as a sophisticated model 
in the regulation of offshore health and safety risks, from an 
environmental perspective, things did not look particularly fit 
for purpose. The environmental regime at some point could 
be characterised as prescriptive and although the issue of 
potential conflict of interest had been resolved in relation to 
health and safety,
82
 it remained unresolved with regards to 
environmental regulation. This was particularly evident 
following the Macondo disaster and the promulgation of the 
EU Offshore Safety Directive, which amongst other 
provisions, was concerned with resolving the issue of potential 
conflict of interest. In this regard, paragraph 20 provided in 
ensuring:  
“the independence and objectivity of the regulator 
… the organisation of administrative competencies 
within a member state can prevent conflict of 
interest by a clear separation between regulatory 
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functions and associated decisions relating to 
offshore safety and environment and to the 
regulatory function relating to the economic 
development of offshore natural resources 
including licensing and revenues management. Such 
conflicts of interest are best prevented by complete 
separation of the competent authority from the 




While the issue of potential conflicts of interest in relation to 
the UK’s health and safety regulatory regime was resolved 
post-Piper-Alpha, the potential for such conflicts of interest 
regarding environmental matters remained unresolved. For 
this reason, Tromans and Norris, therefore, argued that it is 
‘questionable whether the United Kingdom regime is immune 
from the criticisms levelled against the MMS’ before the 
Macondo incident.
84
 This is because the DECC, now the 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
(BEIS), as it was known at the time, remained the competent 
regulatory body for ensuring compliance with environmental 
regulation and also the issuance of production licences.
85
 
However, following the 2013 European Directive, and the 
need for the Member States to comply with its requirements, 
the UK enacted the Offshore Installations (Offshore Safety 
Directive) (Safety Case etc) Regulations 2015 and it also set up 
a new competent authority known as the Offshore Safety 
Directive Regulator (OSDR) as a department of the Health 
and Safety Executive.
86
 The Offshore Safety Directive 
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Regulator is an independent body made up of members of 
both the BEIS and the HSE with a senior oversight board.
87
 
The OSDR is the competent authority tasked with ‘overseeing 
industry compliance with EU Directive on the safety of 
offshore oil and gas operations’.
88
 This includes approval of 
Major Hazard Report (MHR), carrying out routine 
inspections, investigation of incidents as well as the power to 
prohibit operations where it is of the ‘opinion that the 
measures for preventing or limiting the consequence of a 
major accident proposed in the safety case are insufficient’.
89
 
It is safe to say that the creation of the OSDR might contribute 
to resolving the concerns of potential conflict of interest from 
an environmental perspective, some concerns may exist 
considering the OSDR is made up of BEIS staff who are 
equally concerned with the economic developments. Perhaps 
these concerns may be allayed by the Oil and Gas Authority’s 
(OGA) assumption of State’s resources management role and 
statutory consultations with other stakeholders.
90
  
4.1.3   Challenges in Regulating Third-Party Access to   
Infrastructure 
Third-party access to infrastructure is another regulatory 
challenge that has proven difficult in the UK. The complexity 
and challenges arise because the regime seeks to maximise 
economic recovery by relying on new entrants to secure access 
to infrastructure from unwilling infrastructure owners. The 
complexity and challenges of this collaborative arrangement 
are on the basis that “few new discoveries are large enough to 
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justify the creation of an entirely new infrastructure”,
91
 while 
“the efficient use of these existing infrastructure to produce 
new discoveries will postpone decommissioning”.
92
 While this 
should ordinarily be a win-win for everyone in the sense that 
there is significant economic justification in the maximisation 
of economic recovery for both Government and the new 
entrants (applicants) on the one hand and postponement of 
decommissioning for the infrastructure owners on the other, 
there are unresolved competitive interests.
93
 For example, the 
infrastructure owner may see the applicant as a competitor be 
it in the UK or other jurisdictions or may rather choose to 
reserve the ullage for its subsequent use. In all these 
complexities, it becomes the duty of the Government through 




In regulating TPA, the UK has enacted several regulatory 
instruments comprising of both hard and soft law. Some of 
these include the Energy Act 2011, the infrastructure Act 
2015, the Maximisation of Economic Recovery Strategy, Code 
of Practice on Access to Upstream Oil and Gas Infrastructure 
on the UKCS (ICOP) and the Guidance Note. A combined 
reading of these instruments and particularly Sections 82 to 91 
of the Energy Act 2011 suggests that firstly, applicants and 
infrastructure owners should independently negotiate and 
reach an agreement, where they are unable to, the applicant 
can request the intervention of the Oil and Gas Authority 
(OGA) to issue an access notice. Such a request will not be 
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granted if the OGA is not convinced that the parties have had 
a reasonable time to reach an agreement. Furthermore, in 
reaching a decision and haven listened to all interested parties, 
it must take into account the capacity that can be reasonably 
made available; technical incompatibilities which cannot be 
overcome; difficulties, which cannot reasonably be overcome; 
the reasonable needs of the owner and his associate; the 
interest of all users; the need to maintain security and 
regularity of supplies; and the number of parties. 
95
 
Despite this perhaps comprehensive regulatory regime, it 
appeared that there has been some reluctance on the part of 
the applicant to make an application requesting for an access 
notice. Some commentators argue that this could be a result of 
the uniqueness of the oil and gas industry and the idea that a 
party was in some sense running to the Headmaster especially 
in an oil industry that prefers to sort things out themselves in 
a somewhat secretive manner.
96
  To resolve this issue, ICOP 
requires the applicant to submit an Automatic Referral Notice 
(ARN)
97
 before the commencement of negotiations so that if 
an agreement is not reached within six months, the applicant 
will be committed to approaching the OGA to seek for a 
Section 82 access notice. Even though the ARN has been in 




The UK TPA regime is both fragmented and one Uisdean 
Vass describes as a “complex regulatory drama”.
99
 It is a 
system that has several interests pulling in sometimes different 
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directions in such a way that it continues to test the limits of 
regulatory interventions. While the system relies on the 
negotiation of the parties using the legal instruments as a 
guide, TPA is one aspect of the UK regulatory regime that 
confirms the errors of the past in the sense that perhaps if the 
Government played a more active and central role, it might 
have resolved these tensions long before now.   
 
4.1.4   Offshore Decommissioning  
The decommissioning of offshore oil and gas installations 
continues to test the effectiveness of both the international and 
UK regulatory framework. In fact, it was erroneous to think 
that the Brent Spar incident in 1995 had resolved the 
challenges of offshore decommissioning. With over 6500 
offshore oil and gas installations worldwide, 153 in the North 
Sea and cost implications that continue to rise, the issues of 
offshore decommissioning are both pertinent and relevant. 
Recent development surrounding the Brent Delta 
decommissioning appears to reveal the complex and 
fragmented nature of the regime.  
The Brent Delta platform is equivalent in height to the 
London Eye and almost the size of a football pitch. In the last 
40 years, it has served as a processing plant, a factory, and a 
hotel to about 160 staff. In a single lift, the topside weighing 
over 24,000 tonnes was removed in a manner that is described 
as the world’s heaviest offshore lift by a single vessel.
100
 While 
this is uncontroversial and a remarkable feat that should be 
commended, unfortunately, the same cannot be said of Shell’s 
decision to leave three out of four of its 300,000 tonnes (each) 
concrete legs, also known as “Gravity Based Structures” 
(GBS) on the seabed.
101
 Although Shell claims its decision is a 
________________________________________________________ 
100
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result of comprehensive assessments and independent review, 
the German and Dutch Governments, based on commissioned 
reports, have formally raised objections to Shell’s decision.
102
 
In an official letter to Michael Gove, the Secretary of State for 
Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs, the German 
Government expressed concerns that the decision to leave the 
concrete-based structures will negatively impact the marine 
environment, other sea users and therefore, breach the 
provisions of OSPAR, an international agreement for the 
protection of the marine environment. In a report by Scientia 
et Sagacitas an Aberdeen based consultancy commissioned by 
the German Ministry of Environment, the company 
highlighted “major issues” with Shell’s assessment. The report 
further “outlined “failures” around environmental 




The decommissioning of offshore installations is not 
exactly a straightforward one and while the rules under 
OSPAR do appear to take cognisance of these complexities, 
its application could be quite challenging in some cases. 
According to OSPAR decision 98/3, “the dumping, and 
leaving wholly or partly in place, of disused offshore 
installations is prohibited within the OSPAR maritime 
area”.
104
 However, OSPAR adds that “following assessment, 
the competent authority of the relevant contracting party may 
give permission to leave installations or parts of in place if they 
are steel installations weighing more than 10,000 tonnes in the 
air, gravity-based concrete structures; floating concrete 
installations; any concrete anchor-base, which results, or is 
likely to result, in interference with other legitimate uses of the 
sea”.
105
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From the above provision, Shell could be within its rights to 
suggest leaving its gravity-based structures in place but subject 
to the approval of the competent authority, in this case, the 
Department for Business Energy and Industry Strategy 
(BEIS). There is also the requirement to inform other OSPAR 
Contracting Parties of such a decommissioning plan and it is 
on this basis that Germany has raised objections. Although 
this section does not critically examine the details and 
implications of the offshore oil and gas decommissioning 
regime and the provisions of OSPAR more specifically, there 
is a growing body of researchers that appear to question the 
effectiveness of the regime because is both restrictive and 
inflexible.
106
 It must also be admitted that designing a robust 
decommissioning regime that satisfies all stakeholders by 
balancing energy security, cost, environment, and safety will 
be a Herculean task, especially under prevailing political and 
social realities. Regarding the implications of offshore 
decommissioning in the UKCS, the controversy surrounding 
the Brent Delta decommissioning has done nothing but test 
the robustness of regime. Haven said that it is somewhat 
reassuring that the current regime appears quite sophisticated 
in the way that it encourages transparency in the decision-
making process, perhaps in a way that was unavailable two 
decades ago. While it is expected that there would be a 
continuous engagement, collaboration and technological 
advancements that could significantly contribute towards the 
robustness of the UK off decommissioning regime, experts 
have suggested that perhaps we may need to provide some 
clarity regarding the meaning of environmental protection in 
the context of offshore decommissioning and possible other 
use for such disused offshore facility.
107
 Particularly in the 
wake of research suggesting that it may be beneficial to leave 
offshore installations in the ocean in the well-know rig-to-reef 
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practice, which is fairly common in the Gulf of Mexico.
108
 It 
remains unclear whether that is in the interest of the 
environment or not. In the wake of these uncertainties, it is 
evident that there are interesting times ahead for all offshore 
oil and gas decommissioning.
 109
    
4.2   The Norwegian experience 
As with the UK section above, this section examines some of 
the lessons that can be derived from the Norwegian 
experience, across four broad themes: political strife and 
future plans; the regulation of health, safety, and environment; 
access to infrastructure; and decommissioning. It should not 
surprise the reader to learn that the Norwegian experience on 
(and the lessons derived from) each of these fronts is rather 
different from the UK’s, as each issue tends to resonate 
differently in the Norwegian political context.  
4.2.1   Consensus, fiscal stability, and the future 
Unlike the UK, there has been a broad political consensus in 
Norway about how the country’s petroleum regime should be 
developed, and for whom it should benefit. This consensus 
was evident from the start, when the Norwegian parliament 
agreed, unanimously, to accept the ten Oil Commandments as 
the strategic framework for developing the sector. These Ten 
Commandments ensured strong democratic control, a 
sustained effort to secure local content (including a national 
oil company), and an early concern that the development of 
this industry should not be allowed to undermine existing 
Norwegian industries. 
This capacity to pursue a common strategy is part of 
Norway’s political legacy: as a small open economy exposed 
to world markets, it has always worked to develop common 
strategies for adapting to these markets (and the institutions 
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required to secure that adaptation).
110
 But the country also 
benefited (at first) from the lack of any significant domestic 
interests based in the petroleum sector. In the late 1960s, the 
only Norwegian firm with any relationship to the petroleum 
sector was Norsk Hydro - and its interests were minor 
(mostly through retail sales). Norsk Hydro’s historical roots 
lay with the fertilizer industry, exploiting Norway’s cheap 
hydroelectric resources, as described above. The Norwegian 
government enjoyed relatively free reigns when developing 
the sector, and it could do so in a way that best benefited the 
Norwegian public, more generally. This freedom came from 
not having to bow to the pressures of strong and vested 
commercial interests at home (as they had not yet developed), 
and the state’s willingness to confront powerful foreign 
interests abroad (once oil was found). This relative autonomy 
is clearly seen in the government’s continued insistence to 
limit the pace of development - for fear of its effect on the 
economy (in the form of Dutch Disease), or the environment 
(e.g. to limit drilling in the environmentally sensitive areas 
above the 62
nd
 parallel).   
The Norwegian political consensus about petroleum 
policy has also been maintained by an institutional 
arrangement that helps to ensure that commercial interests 
cannot capture the regulatory and policymaking channels of 
the Norwegian government. This is the tripartite institutional 
structure that is key to the Norwegian model, where: 




b) Regulatory responsibility lies with an autonomous 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD),
112
 later 
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c) Commercial and operational expertise is housed in the 
Norwegian NOC, Statoil (now Equinor
114
). 
This institutional division of labour made it more difficult for 
a growing commercial concern (e.g. Statoil) to capture and 
influence the regulatory conditions and/or policy trajectory 
under which it laboured. This, in itself, is helpful for building 
consensus around the Norwegian petroleum management 
strategy.  
This talk of consensus does not mean that there have not 
been significant differences between the left and the right on 
particular issues related to petroleum. The Labour Party, in 
general, was far more interested in developing local expertise 
and content and using the state’s power to secure that local 
content. As the Labour Party was in power during most of the 
early years of Norway’s petroleum adventure, its interests are 
clearly evident in the country’s institutional developments and 
regulatory trajectory. The Conservative Party (Høyre) tended 
to embrace a more liberal, free-market, approach to industrial 
development, but the Conservative Party remained mostly on 
the electoral sidelines throughout the 1970s and could only 
affect developments on the margins.  
These differences were particularly pronounced on the 
role of the Norwegian NOC. The Conservatives, when in 
government, tried to secure a controlling share in Norsk 
Hydro, rather than start a new NOC from scratch. When the 
Labour Party took over the government in March of 1971, it 
abandoned these plans and moved quickly to establish a new 
firm, Statoil, before showering it with privileges. This allowed 
Statoil to grow very quickly - in terms of both size and 
operational experience.  As Statoil grew, The Conservative 
Party began to worry about its influences, and warned that the 
Norwegian NOC was becoming a “state within a state.” This 
growing concern led to the eventual privatization of Statoil in 
1985, and the creation of an institutional firewall between 
Norway’s operational interests (harboured at Statoil) and its 
financial interests offshore (now housed in another NOC, 
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). But even as Statoil has become a private global firm, 
the Norwegian government retains control over a substantial 
majority of shares in the company (roughly 67%).
116
 
This consensus over how to manage its offshore 
petroleum resources was used to secure two types of 
advantages for the Norwegian people: political and economic. 
Foreign observers tend to focus on the enormous wealth that 
Norway has accumulated in its sovereign wealth fund, the 
GPFG. While this is an important signpost of Norwegian 
success, it is more interesting to consider how that Fund has 
been fed, how Norway managed to secure the resource rents 
from its petroleum resources and used them to benefit the 
domestic population.  
On the economic front, early on, the Norweigan 
experience was quite different from the British. In Norway, 
there is little evidence of a “political economy of speed” - quite 
the opposite! The Norwegian authorities decided to slow the 
pace of development to ensure that Norwegian firms could 
participate in the Eldorado (and to deflect Dutch Disease). 
When it became evident there were viable fields on the NCS, 
the Norwegian government quickly changed the fiscal terms 
of trade, and raised tax levels and ownership terms. The 
radically different terms evident in the first and second 
allocation rounds are clear evidence of the Norwegian 
government’s capacity to use the Obsolescing Bargaining 
Mechanism (OBM) to its advantage.
117
 International Oil 
Companies protested, of course, but they were not scared off: 
they could still make a great deal of money in the North Sea, 
and their threats of exit proved hollow. Finally, as the money 
began to roll in from offshore fields, it was first used to pay 
down debts, develop national infrastructure and expand social 
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services: it took a quarter of a century before Norway started 
saving money in its GPFG.  
On the political front, the Norwegian government used its 
licensing regime to ensure the inclusion and growth of 
Norwegian expertise. This political favouring is most evident 
in the growth of Statoil, but Statoil itself was able to use its 
dominant position to allocate favours to a broader range of 
Norwegian suppliers. In the early years, Statoil benefited from 
a licensing regime that: one, secured it major license shares in 
most allocation rounds; two, ensured its operator status in 
those licenses (even before many competitors thought it was 
ready); three, carried its interests; four, granted extra voting 
rights (enough to commit the license) and five, allowed for a 
sliding production and rewards scale in the bigger fields.
118
 
With Statoil controlling many of the offshore production 
licenses, it could (and did) help Norwegian firms access the 
sector and develop their competencies.  
Norway’s petroleum industry grew up and matured 
under these sorts of (infant industry) protective policies. 
Today, Norwegian firms in this industry are active around the 
world and are seen to be highly competitive internationally. 
Norwegian policy no longer provides the sort of explicit 
protections it did in the 1970s (and the international context 
today makes it much more difficult to pursue these types of 
policies), but these early protections were essential in the 
development of her domestic industry and will allow 
Norwegian firms to continue business (abroad) even after the 
petroleum is drained from the NCS.  
On the other hand, the growth of a strong domestic 
petroleum sector changed the balance of political power in 
Norway. As the industry grew, so too did its political 
influence, and Norwegian governments (on both the left and 
the right) found it increasingly difficult to pursue policies that 
would impact negatively on this powerful industry. As a 
consequence, the consensus that once supported Norwegian 
policy began to erode, and new cleavages and concerns grew 
to limit the influence of the petroleum industry on Norwegian 
policy. The most evident of these new cleavages is the one that 
separates the country over the future of oil and gas. There is 
no longer consensus about the role of petroleum in Norway’s 
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future. We return to this new political cleavage below. The 
economic gains are clearly evident in the size of the world’s 
largest SWF: the GPFG. Yet, by focusing on the size of this 
investment fund, we often lose sight of the important 
instruments by which it was filled. Norway’s petroleum fund 
was not originally formed as a savings account, and it took 
some time before it began to play that role. Indeed, money 
began to flow into the Fund only after the Norwegian 
government had funded more necessary objectives, including 
paying off its debts and building up the Norwegian welfare 
state and social services. It took roughly 25 years after the first 
oil began to be pumped out of the NCS that the first money 
began to flow into the GPFG.   
The original objective of the Fund was to help stabilize the 
Norwegian economy from the volatile price swings of the oil 
market, and the threat of Dutch Disease. For this reason, 
severe constraints were placed on the government’s ability to 
withdraw money from the Fund. Of course, these constraints 
also helped to grow the Fund quickly, as the Fund’s principal 
remained relatively protected and grew with new payments 
each year from the petroleum sector.  
Many foreign observers do not recognize the source of 
these deposits into the Fund. To ensure that the oil companies 
do not abscond with the resource rent (which belongs to the 
Norwegian people), the Norwegian government employs a 
very high corporate income tax rate on petroleum producers: 
roughly 78 per cent (while providing for very generous 
opportunities for deductions).
119
 These tax revenues constitute 
the majority of Norwegian petroleum revenues (about 60% 
before the 2014 oil price crash). The second-biggest source of 
petroleum revenues for the Norwegian state comes in the form 
of the state’s direct financial interests in offshore production 
licenses, the so-called SDFI. In 2013, these licenses generated 
36 per cent of the Norwegian government’s petroleum 
revenues. Dividends from the NOC, Statoil, generated a mere 
four per cent of the state’s total petroleum revenues. In 2020, 
the size and share of these different sources have changed 
________________________________________________________ 
119
 See Norwegian Petroleum (2020) “The Petroleum Tax System.” 30.-
09.2020 06:02 draft. Online at: https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/- 
economy/petroleum-tax/.  Accessed on the 30
th
 of September 2020.  
The Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy    288 
slightly: today, the dividends from Equinor constitutes 15.7 pe 
cent of the government’s petroleum revenues; petroleum taxes 
generate just 32.5 per cent, while SDFI is the largest source 
(42.3%). The remaining 7.3 per cent are made up of diverse 
environmental taxes and area fees.
120
 
The design of this fiscal regime provides significant 
stability. This is primarily because the petroleum money is not 
allowed to enter directly the national economy and 
government budget: it is funnelled directly to the GPFG, 
which invests entirely offshore (it is not allowed to invest in 
Norway). Hence, while most states funnel their petroleum 
revenues into their government budget, spend accordingly, 
and then deposit whatever remains in their SWF—the 
Norwegians keep their petroleum money offshore: they 
bypass the domestic economy and only allow a small share of 
the accumulated petroleum revenues to enter the government 
budget. In particular, the government limits its access to the 
Fund, by way of an informal agreement (the so-called 
budgetary rule, or handlingsregel) that allows only three to 
four per cent of the projected return from the Fund to be 
transferred to the government budget. This rule ensures that 
the government receives an even and stable stream of revenue 
from the Fund (even as petroleum prices remain volatile), 




For the most part, the tax regime in Norway has remained 
remarkably stable. As already noted, the initial radical change 
in tax and ownership terms (starting with the second 
allocation round), generated a great deal of concern, 
opposition and threats to exit (from international oil 
companies). Since that time, however, the fiscal regime has 
remained remarkably stable. The international oil companies 
have accepted the terms offered by the Norwegian 
government, and have learned to appreciate the stability of the 
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Norwegian regime and the trust it produces (despite its high 
costs for these firms).  
In the end, the ability of the Norwegian state to secure a 
financial and operational share of the offshore petroleum 
activity, and the willingness to secure the resulting rent with a 
high corporate tax rate, allows a large and steady flow into the 
Fund, tucked away for future generations.  
4.2.2   Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) Regulation 
The offshore petroleum industry is very lucrative, but it is also 
very dangerous, complicated and “dirty”. From the start, 
Norwegian policymakers have been aware of the 
environmental threat posed by drilling for oil in Arctic areas 
exposed to extremely challenging production conditions. The 
original ten Oil Commandments included one that would 
restrict exploration and development above the 62
nd
 degree 
parallel, out of concerns for environmental sensitivity and the 
increased challenge of production in ice-filled waters and 
under harsher weather and surface conditions.  
The threat of catastrophe is always present in the 
petroleum sector, and government officials are in constant 
need of high-quality, independent expertise to ensure its safe 
development. As the editors of a recent volume on Risk 
Governance of Offshore Oil and Gas operations note:  
These offshore activities involve sophisticated 
analytical methods, heavy engineering, large-scale 
investment, and complex projects, and they must be 
managed appropriately to ensure that benefits are 
gained without incurring major accidents and other 
unacceptable harms to the public, the workers 
involved, and the human and natural environment. 
This requires partnerships between public 
regulators and industry, the involvement of labour 
and other stakeholders, a supporting role for 
researchers, mutual trust that best practices will be 
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As in the UK, and any other country dealing with the 
challenges of petroleum extraction, one of the biggest 
management challenges is to balance the desire to decrease 
production costs while still protecting worker safety and the 
environment.   
A recognition of this potential conflict of interest lies at 
the heart of the Norwegian tripartite model, where the 
authorities hoped to establish an independent source of 
professional expertise, in the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate (NPD), to counterbalance (and complement) the 
expert advice coming directly from the industry. Created in 
1972, the NPD was first designed to collect, map and process 
all the information and geological material coming in from the 
NCS; and to provide policymakers with solid, independent 
data to inform their policymaking with regard to efficient, but 
also safe, production. Originally, the NPD was supervised by 
the Ministry of Industry (where the mining and the nascent 
petroleum sectors were located), but it enjoyed its own 
(independent) Board of Directors. Originally, this level of 
institutional autonomy was thought to suffice.   
By the end of the 1970s, however, it became clear that this 
was not the case: the existing production routines and 
practices were insufficient. Offshore working conditions were 
proving to be very dangerous, much more so than in 
comparable mainland industries. One of the biggest challenges 
to improving conditions offshore was the reluctance of 
international oil companies to embrace Norway’s corporatist 
traditions, and the strong role played by unions in developing 
and managing Norwegian industrial policy. The industry 
fought hard to keep Norway’s onshore unions at bay and was 
largely successful in this effort before the 1980s.  
Two major offshore accidents shook the confidence of 
Norwegian policymakers and prompted significant reforms in 
both safety and environmental regulation offshore. First, in 
1977, a blowout on the Ekofisk Bravo platform resulted in 
about 200,000 barrels of oil spilling into the North Sea.
123
 
Remarkably, no one died in the incident, but it became evident 
that the existing management regime was not up to the 
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environmental task at hand. Then, in 1978, the Alexander L. 
Kielland platform collapsed and sunk, claiming 123 lives.
124
  
These two disasters fuelled a critical review of Norwegian 
safety and environmental regulations and increased public 
scrutiny on the apparent conflict of interests within the NPD. 
The public became more critical of the NPD’s capacity to 
promote efficient production while still protecting workers 
and the environment. These accidents also increased the policy 
space into which Norwegian labour unions could enter, and 
their increased influence has had a substantial effect on the 
nature of Norway’s subsequent offshore regulatory regime.  
On the regulatory front, responsibilities for the working 
environment and emergency preparedness were moved from 
the NPD to the Ministry of Local Government and Labour 
(and subsequently to the Ministry of Labour, in 2001). In 
1994, the NPD was split in two, with the NPD keeping 
responsibility for regulations that apply to 
management/efficiency issues, and a new Petroleum Safety 
Authority (PSA) was made responsible for regulating health 
and safety issues.
125
 No longer would the NPD report to the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy alone; it would be required 
now to report to other relevant ministries as well (e.g., Labour 
and Social Affairs, Climate and Environment …). Today, 
much of the heavy regulatory lifting occurs in the Plans for 
Development and Operation (PDA), which require a 
description of all relevant aspects related to technical, safety 
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  See Petroleum Act of 29 November 1996 no. 79 relating to petroleum ac-
tivities, as amended: Section 4-2, §2. Online at https://www.npd.no/en-
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The accident also underscored the need for greater worker 
voice and influence in the decision-making process offshore. 
After a series of costly strikes and increased political pressure, 
the industry slowly acquiesced and began to support the sort 
of tripartite HSE approaches that dominate in other 
Norwegian sectors. In particular, the state, industry and 
workers organizations began to cooperate in discussing, 
developing and implementing HSE regulations, and 
eventually (2001) a new management system was introduced 
that prioritized internal control, operator responsibility and 
an appropriate HSE culture. This new system shifted 
responsibility for safety regulation from the state to firms and 




The advantages of this new system were highlighted in the 
wake of the 2010 Macondo disaster in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Before the accident, US regulations were generally 
prescriptive with little application of systematic risk 
management approaches. This stands in stark contrast to 
Norway’s offshore regulations, which are primarily 
performance-based and supplemented with prescriptive 
requirements via established norms and standards. After the 
Macondo disaster, the Norwegian regulatory regime and 
industry standards were deemed “robust and fit for 
purpose,”
128
 even if a number of specific recommendations 
were made in a series of post-accident analyses. These include 
things like updating drilling and well standards; developing 
________________________________________________________ 
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equipment that can better cap blowouts, and developing better 
barrier and risk management approaches. 
129
 
Perhaps the greatest political cleavage in Norway 
concerns the future of the oil industry as it pushes into more 
sensitive Arctic waters. As production has increased in size 
and space, it has increasingly encroached on the fishing 
industry and some of Norway’s most productive fishing 
grounds. This is a cleavage that sets fishing communities 
against those that support oil production (and the jobs and 
revenues it generates). In 2006, the government announced a 
management plan for drilling in the (northernmost) Barents 
Sea. Although it eventually banned drilling around some of 
the country’s most productive and sensitive fishing area, e.g. 
the Lofoten islands), the issue threatens to pop up again in the 
future. The current government is very responsive to pressure 
emanating from the petroleum sector, and has agreed to 
expand drilling in previously untouched areas of the Arctic - 
pushing the boundary of development into the so-called “ice 
edge”.
130
 In the current (25
th
) allocation round, eight of the 
nine acreages suggested for new oil drilling are in the 
environmentally-sensitive Barents Sea, while only one area is 
in the Norwegian Sea.
131
 
Hence, as the Norwegian petroleum industry had grown 
more powerful, and more and more Norwegians rely on that 
industry for their livelihood, it has become difficult to break 
the expansion of petroleum into increasingly risky and 
challenging environments.  
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 Nilsen, Thomas (2020) “Norway proposes to open 125 new oil 
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4.2.3   Access to Infrastructure 
The Norwegian authorities have always prioritized the need 
to maintain public control over the country’s petroleum 
infrastructure. This need was clearly evident in the 6
th
 Oil 
Commandment, which required that “Petroleum from the 
NCS must, as a main rule, be landed in Norway.” The need 
and style of government control over infrastructure are 
particularly evident in its approach to controlling the vast 
networks of pipelines that service the NCS, and the changes it 
has needed to ensure that public control.  
In the early years of the Norwegian gas adventure, the 
infrastructure was largely controlled by Statoil, as the state’s 
representative in many of the licenses. In 1983, as part of an 
attempt to limit Statoil’s increased power and influence, the 
MPE created a “Gas Committee” to coordinate the country’s 
gas activities. Then, in 1985, a Gas Sales Negotiations 
Committee (Gassforhandlingsutvalget, or GFU) was created 
to market and sell Norwegian gas. The GFU was made up of 
Norway’s three largest oil companies: Statoil, Norsk Hydro 
and Saga. All companies producing gas on the NSF were 




In 2001, this system was undermined by the EU Gas 
Directive, and Norway was forced to transfer the 
responsibilities of the GFU over to a new Norwegian NOC, 
Gassco, which is one hundred per cent owned and controlled 
by the Norwegian government.
133
 Today, Gassco operates all 
of Norway’s natural gas pipelines (in a joint venture called 
Gassled) and administers access to an extensive gas delivery 
regime. In doing so, Gassco ensures third party access on 
neutral and transparent terms.
134
   
With such an extensive gas delivery network already in 
place, the government has tried to encourage oil companies to 
exploit it more effectively, allowing better utilization of the 
underlying resource. To that end, the government introduced 
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and a new type of concessions system in 2003.
135
 This new 
system, called “Awards in Predefined Areas (APA), is 
designed to get more out of the developed areas on the NCS, 
where the geology is already known, where there are fewer 
technical challenges, and where it is easy to hook up to already 
existing infrastructure of pipelines. The objective was to 
increase the effectiveness and simplicity of the allocation 
process in more mature areas, to better exploit existing 
infrastructure and to provide more stability/predictability for 
firms working in the area. This new allocation system was 
designed to make it easier for small companies to participate 
and to allow group application of licenses.
136
 The APA 
allocations occur annually (traditional concession rounds tend 
to occur every other year), and more licenses are now allocated 
through APA schemes than through the traditional 
concessions scheme. In short, the Norwegian government 
maintains control over the infrastructure and manages it in a 
way that is consistent with EU regulations, to ensure neutral 
access. 
4.2.4   Decommissioning 
In Norway, the issue of decommissioning receives little public 
attention, in contrast to the very vibrant debate about how 
(and when) the country will need to transition away from its 
heavy dependence on petroleum. In contrast to the British 
case, it is interesting to note the lack of a vibrant political 
discussion about decommissioning in Norway. We might 
speculate that there can be two reasons for this. The first 
reason may be because explicit decommissioning 
requirements are clearly included in the license requirements 
issued by the Norwegian authorities. Section 5-3 of the 1996 
Petroleum Act required license holders to submit a 
decommissioning plan to the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy (MPE), within two to five years before a license 
expires (or the cessation of activities). Retired facilities must 
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be removed in their entirety, and can only be abandoned on 
the field in very limited cases and after extended use.
137
 In 
addition, Article 60 of the UN Convention on the Laws of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) holds that offshore facilities shall, as a rule, be 
removed. Finally, Norway is a party to the Oslo-Paris 
(OSPAR) Convention, which contains specific obligations 
with regard to cessation and decommissioning, including the 
prohibition of dumping disused offshore installations.
138
 
The second reason for a lack of public attention to 
decommissioning issues in Norway may be the result of its 
successful efforts at extending the lifetime of its offshore 
fields, by way of new (APA) concession systems (see above) 
along with a number of additional incentives.  In this way, 
Norway has been able to postpone the big wave of 
commissions that will eventually come.  
When that happens, the Norwegian parliament can get 
involved with the decommissioning process under certain 
conditions. Norwegian regulatory authorities are free to make 
decisions about the removal of subsea facilities, floating steel 
facilities and the topsides of concrete installations without 
submitting their decision to parliament. Yet, if the case 
involves the disposal of concrete facilities and the jacket on 
large, fixed steel facilities, then the MPE is expected to consult 
with the parliament (and OSPAR) before deciding how to 
proceed. It is important to note that pipelines are not covered 
by the OSPAR Convention, such that the decommissioning 
options for pipelines vary by each individual case, based on a 
comprehensive evaluation, where costs are assessed in relation 
to the consequences for safety, environment, fisheries and 
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The Norwegian authorities think that just under half of the 
expected recoverable resources on the NCS have been 
produced, and many of the older facilities are approaching the 
end of their expected lifetimes. Today there are currently 
twelve concrete facilities, 20 steel floating facilities and 62 
fixed steel facilities in operation (plus 400 subsea installations). 
To date, the Frigg field has been the largest field 
decommissioned. Production in this field ceased in 2004, the 
offshore disposal work started in 2005, and the 
decommissioning was completed in 2010. The particular date 
of future decommissioning projects continues to be extended, 
as new tie-ins (satellite fields) and improved recovery 
initiatives continue to extend field lifetimes (beyond the 




More contentious is the decision to continue expanding 
production on the NCS, even given stringent 
decommissioning requirements. Norway expects to continue 
producing significant volumes of oil and gas for decades, even 
if its younger generations are increasingly vocal in their 
opposition to these plans. The NPD has argued that it will be 
possible to maintain production from the [petroleum] sector 
at a very high level for decades to come and has projected only 
a slight decline in oil and gas production through to 2040.
141
 
 It is unclear whether the Norwegian public is willing to 
support such long-term plans.  A recent “Climate Change 
Report, underscored the vulnerability of the Norwegian 
economy to a major fall in petroleum prices and activity and 
emphasized a need to begin transitioning to a post-oil 
economy.
142
 Norwegian engineering students seem to be 
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boycotting the petroleum trades and seeking out more 
climate-friendly careers.
143
 And several of the country’s 
political parties are now competing with one another in 




The above analysis demonstrates that both experiences in the 
North Sea showed positive and negative lessons in the UK and 
Norway, despite their remarkably different regulatory 
governance and management regimes. These experiences 
could provide useful comparative knowledge for other 
emerging and/or mature jurisdictions elsewhere in the world. 
However, it is important to highlight that these experiences 
evolved over the past decades and were directly related to their 
political, economic, cultural, and other backgrounds and 
peculiar characteristics. So a simple “copy and paste” 
approach (especially in a relatively short timeline) is less likely 
to work elsewhere. It is suggested that transplanting these 
approaches will require strategic planning and the requisite 
political will.  
In any case, climate change and energy transition will be 
significant in defining the future of oil and gas developments 
and how the industry can achieve more sustainable goals, 
lower carbon footprint and benefit society as a whole. The key 
consideration will be how oil/gas-rich countries can strike the 
appropriate balance between maximising economic recovery 
of oil and gas resources and making significant contributions 
to climate goals. Perhaps, the Norwegian initiatives to tax 
carbon emissions might become more common and countries 
managing hydrocarbon resources might have to deal with the 
non-development of certain areas due to higher environmental 
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concerns. Nevertheless, oil and gas activities are most likely to 
remain an important economic, social, and security 
development for the years to come and so would the quest for 
a robust regulatory governance regime.  
 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
One important lesson can be devired from the UK experience. 
While it is difficult to ignore the benefits of oil and gas to the 
UK economy, the challenges associated with regulating such a 
complex and fast-evolving industry remains undeniable. The 
above analysis suggests that perhaps the UK would have 
benefitted from a more forward-thinking and strategic 
planning approach and discarded its non-interventionist 
attitude to petroleum governance. Except for the tax regime 
which suffered a variety of interventions most approaches 
were laisser faire. This could have led to a more proactive 
licensing and regulatory regime that might have avoided or 
mitigated against some of the regulatory challenges addressed 
above. Following the uncertainty in the price of oil, the shift 
towards renewable energy, the economic and political 
implications of the UK leaving the European Union, the 
uncertainties of the UK oil and gas industry remain. While the 
UK did not experience the resource curse in the way many less 
sophisticated regimes did (i.e. due mostly to its diversified 
economy), it is hard to ignore the connection between the 
Scottish call for independence and the desire to control its 
hydrocarbon resources and the concerns that future 
generations might have over their natural resources. Perhaps 
such calls might have been ameliorated by the creation of a 
sovereign wealth fund like was done in Norway. Although the 
UK showed a number of lessons learnt about the management 
of its resources it remains of the few ultra-mature and robust 
legal regimes in the world.  
In addition, two important lessons can be derived from the 
Norwegian experience. First, many of the benefits Norway 
derives from its petroleum resources are a consequence of its 
loud and public recognition that these resources belong to the 
people of Norway, and the rents that result from these 
resources also belong with the people. Once a strong 
democratic foundation was established over the control and 
ownership of these resources, many of the resulting decisions 
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followed easily: it was important to restrict the pace of 
development, assure national control and develop national 
competencies, and to ensure that international oil companies 
did not abscond with the significant rents that resulted. After 
all, it is these rents that fill the GPFG: now the world’s largest 
sovereign wealth fund. The second lesson is still being 
contested: the utility of exporting this management model to 
Norway’s other natural resources. Public debate in Norway is 
now moving beyond oil and gas (even if the petroleum 
industry drags its feet). But the most important lesson of 
Norway’s management past is not being carried into the 
future. Norway has had tremendous success in managing its 
natural resources in the public interest; first with regard to 
hydroelectric power, then with regard to its petroleum 
resources. In these sectors, unlike in petroleum, any and all 
resulting rents are now allowed to fall into private hands. For 
students of Norwegian petroleum history, it is sad to see this 
lesson lost on the current and future generations.  
Nevertheless, important lessons from both the UK and 
Norway could be summarised as follows in the importance of:  
a) Stragetic and long-term planning. 
b) Stability in the regime (especially in the political consensus 
and fiscal regime). 
c) Strong industrial and economic development in other areas 
related to oil and gas. 
d) Educational level in the country, strong legal system, 
transparency, and low level of corruption, (e) third party 
access in order to allow higher rates of commercial 
developments. 
e) No signature bonus required in order to increase higher 
commitments and expendires on exploration work (g) 
abolishment of royalty as they moved towards mature 
provinces. 
f) Avoid conflict of interest between promoting the sector and 
dealing with HSE issues under the same “structure”. 
g) Creation of SWF and diversification of the economy in order 
to avoid the resource curse. 
h) The end of local content policies might have “forced” local 
companies to be more competitive and international.  
